Every now and then I intend to respond or comment on some part of second amendment court cases. This post deal with my first selection from the case titled above at the supreme court.
"Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, 2792*2792 prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding."
First, it is not necessary to take the argument to which the text above responds in the form suggested of "only those arms in existence in the 18th century" but it can also be understood to mean excluding current arms that are not reasonably expected to be part of the vision and expectations at that time.
In any case, I personally prefer to concentrate on the vision and foreseeability (or lack of it) for the type of weapons held by a military in our time and that is related to another part to which I intend to respond at some later time.
Nevertheless, no matter how one may see the validity of the argument to which the quoted text responds that response is wrong. it is wrong because it compares the generality of the meanings of words related to actions with those related to objects and things. If for example a person promises another something if that other person comes the next day then it is generally very reasonable to see that the promising person would be required to fulfill his promise no matter how much it was unexpected the way that other person used to achieve that. On the other hand, if the instructions for some collage exam, for example, states that "No computer allowed" then that it is not unreasonable to see that not being interpreted to mean a basic calculator cannot be used in the exam although it is also used for computing things. I think that is clearly how meanings related to objects in comparison to those related to actions are generally understood everywhere.
One may also be able to say that the quoted text above incorrectly treated things that are conceptual only with things that also exist as objects then followed that by equating the different forms through which the same conceptual thing may come with different things on which the same name of an object may apply. [(Added 11/15/2013) Those who refer to conceptual only things (for example the freedom of speech) recognize their free attachment capability and therefore expect the different forms of its implementations. The same thing does not apply on physical objects.Also since "Speech" and "Search" ,for example, do not exist on their own they may therefore ,like a fluid, take the shape of the medium or form through which it is conveyed or implemented]
The "No computer allowed" if intended to prevent using even a calculator could have been stated as "No computing device allowed". In the case of "arms" in the second amendment ,and for it to be similar in clarity to the examples in the quoted text, it could had been expressed ,for example, using the definition of what arms are. On the other hand when someone just use the word "arms" then it is much less clear whether he is referring to all things on which the definition of that word apply or just what is being called as "arms" at his time. Ignoring the other possibility despite the fact that generally its use could be by far much more than the first doesn't seem very convincing or at least won't make it equivalent to the examples mentioned in the quoted text . Anyone can think with himself about how many times he used object names to refer to currently existing objects in comparison with how many times he used them to refer to all things on which the definitions of those names apply.
[(Added 11/15/2013) One very important difference between the examples given and the argument to which the quoted text is responding that can make that argument sound much less "bordering on the frivolous" is the justification or explanation mentioned at the beginning of the first amendment and the lack of something similar to it in the other examples (and probably the entire constitution). That justification suggests an effort to compromise between the danger of arms on civilian life and the protection of a democratic system at its infancy during that time. So it is clearly not outrageous to think that unlike other things in the constitution there is no limitless domain here and that one doing a critical compromising or balancing of things like those related to the second amendment may make decisions that are more tied to the status of things at that time which clearly can include the kind and capabilities of arms used at that time]
District of Columbia v. Heller
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